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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
in the safety deposit box from the time he delivered the key to his
brother to the date of his death.
As to the gift theory, the court found that there was a clear donative
intent but there was no delivery, and, therefore, the gift failed. The
delivery of the key, in and of itself, was not a sufficient delivery, and
the fact that the decedent himself entered the box on several occasions in-




Plaintiff, in New Way Family Laundry, Incorporated v. City of
Toledo,1 brought suit to recover damages for interference with ingress
to and egress from its business. The City of Toledo and the State of
Ohio had constructed a concrete divider strip in the middle of the street
upon which New Way's property abutted. The divider prevented motor-
ists from making left turns into the property and necessitated a circuitous
route, of one or two miles in length, in order to reach the property from
the easterly lane (the one furthest from the property). It should be
noted that there was no change in the grade of the street and no appro-
priation of plaintiff's property.
The supreme court, with very little discussion, reversed the judgments
of the court of common pleas and the court of appeals, holding that an
owner has no right to the continuation or maintenance of the flow of traf-
fic past his property and that elimination of turns across traffic into his
property is not an actionable interference with the right of ingress and
egress.
Village of Blue Ash v. City of Cincinnati3 involved an unusual
situation in which the Village of Blue Ash attempted to block the pro-
posed appropriation of a part of one of its streets by the City of Cincin-
nati. The city was attempting to acquire land for a feeder airport and
needed this property, even though it had already been dedicated to another
public use. The court found that the operation of an airport is not a
governmental function, but rather a proprietary function in the nature of
a public utility. Therefore, the City of Cincinnati represented, in the
condemnation proceeding, a body in the nature of a public utility. Also,
1. 171 Ohio St. 242, 168 N.E.2d 885 (1960).
2. The majority of the opinion is quoted from State ex rel. Merritt v. Linzell, 163 Ohio St.
97, 126 N.E.2d 53 (1955).
3. 166 N.E.2d 788 (Ohio C.P. 1960).
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the court emphasized that the taking would be for a second public use
which would destroy the first, i.e., the roadway.
The court, considering the two aforementioned factors, decided that
there was no express or implied authority to appropriate the public
property and the condemnation of the roadway would be an unreasonable
interference with a public easement already in existence. Therefore, Blue
Ash prevailed and the city could not proceed with the condemnation.
The question of what constitutes the taking of property was presented
to the supreme court in State ex rel. Schiederer v. Preston.4  Relator
instituted a mandamus action in that court to require the Director of
Highways to formally appropriate her property rights allegedly taken
when the grade of the street upon which her property abutted was raised
eighteen feet. The petition alleged that raising the grade would inter-
fere with the property owner's view over the street and destroy the rela-
tive harmony of the street and the land adjacent to it. There was no
allegation that relator's right of access to her property had been inter-
fered with. The court held that such a change of grade did not consti-
tute a taking of relator's property. In so holding, the court refused to
equate the right of access to a street, which has been held to constitute
a taking,5 with the owner's right to an unobstructed view.
In its opinion, the court was careful to' distinguish two earlier cases
which permitted recovery, Village of Port Clinton v. Fall' and Cohen v.
Cleveland.' The appropriation in the Port Clinton case was for the con-
struction of a railroad to be elevated above the grade of the street, hence,
the taking was not for a street or highway purpose and was therefore
actionable. In the Cohen case, the relief sought was for the interfer-
ence with light and air and for continuous noise and jarring. The court,
in the Schiederer opinion, emphasized that it should not be inferred
that "the impairment of light and air would be sufficient for the award
of damages,"8 because in the Cohen syllabus the two different elements,
impairment of light and air and noise and jarring, were stated conjunc-
tively.
A word of caution was given by the Common Pleas Court of Frank-
lin County in Ohio Fuel Gas Company v. Sun Oil Company.9 Plaintiff
sought injunctive relief against the Sun Oil Company which .was con-
structing a service station on property it leased from a third party. Years
before the defendant leased the premises, plaintiff had obtained, and
4. 170 Ohio St. 542, 166 N.B.2d 748 (1960).
5. State ex rel. McKay v. Kauer, 156 Ohio St. 347, 102 NE.2d 703 (1951).
6. 99 Ohio St. 153, 124 NE. 189 (1919).
7. 43 Ohio St. 190, 1 N.E. 589 (1885).
8. 170 Ohio St. 542, 547, 166 N.E2d 748, 752 (1960).
9. 164 N.E.2d 922 (Ohio C.P. 1958).
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recorded, an easement from the owner for its gas mains which supplied
about forty per cent of Columbus's natural gas supply. The court,
primarily on the basis of public policy, granted the injunction. Although
plaintiff had reserved the right of ingress and egress to its lines, the
court was not impressed with the added burden which having them
covered with several inches of concrete would impose. The basic con-
sideration was the safety factor. The court reasoned that the risk of fire
and explosion which would be created by having large amounts of gaso-
line near the high pressure gas mains was more than the public should
bear. It felt that the real party in interest in this case was not the Ohio
Fuel Gas Company but rather the thousands of consumers of natural
gas who would be affected if there were a disruption of service. It
should be noted that apparently there was very little evidence offered on
the safety aspects of this case, although the court did cite several cases
dealing with the paramount interest of such a public utility.
In the case of Mentor Harbor Yachting Club v. Mentor Lagoons, In-
corporated,1" the plaintiff, owner of land adjacent to a channel into Lake
Erie, brought suit to enjoin the defendant and other property owners from
using this channel for access to Lake Erie. The defendants owned land
adjacent to lagoons which were being developed for residential and
recreational boating purposes. The lagoons were man-made extensions
of the channel.
The gravamen of the lawsuit, according to the supreme court, was
whether the watercourse was a naturally navigable one. If a channel is
naturally navigable, it is public, and the plaintiff could not prevail. In
determining this question, the court relied on its own 1955 decision in
Coleman v. Schaeffer." In the Coleman case, the court "extended the
criteria for determining navigability beyond the so-called 'commercial
usage' test ' announced in the earlier supreme court decision of East Bay
Sporting Club v. Miller.' Suitability of a waterway for recreational
uses is thus as important a factor in determining navigability as commer-
cial suitability. The affirmation of the Coleman rule and modification
of the East Bay rule was necessary to defendant's case since the uses it
contemplated did not include any of a commercial character. The court
very clearly expressed its opinion that the use of Ohio's waterways for
pleasure is just as important as their use for commercial purposes.
The court had little difficulty in determining the second important
question, i.e., was the channel naturally navigable. The evidence showed
that at times a sandbar would appear, as a result of the action of the pre-
10. 170 Ohio St. 193, 163 N.E.2d 373 (1959).
11. 163 Ohio St. 202, 126 N.E.2d 444 (1955).
12. 170 Ohio St. 193, 199, 163 N.E.2d 373, 378 (1959).
13. 118 Ohio St. 360, 161 NE. 12 (1928).
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vailing winds and shifting sands, which required dredging to keep the
channel open. The court had held in the East Bay case that a water-
course need not flow continuously as long as it had a well defined course
and banks. Therefore, because this channel was suited for recreational
uses and had a definite course and banks, it was a naturally navigable
- therefore public - channel, and the plaintiff was not granted the
relief it sought. This decision, while not advancing any new law, does
clarify the court's position on questions which will become more impor-
tant throughout the state as the number of pleasure boat owners increases.
While the law relating to the drainage of surface water did not
undergo any major changes, two cases emphasize the fine distinctions that
exist in this area. The prime factor responsible for this problem is the
building of houses, apartments, commercial buildings, roads, and park-
ing lots which collect rain water rather than allowing it to percolate
gradually into the bare ground. The plaintiff golf dub, in Oakwood
Club v. City of South Euclid,'4 sought an injunction to prevent the
city from draining surface waters into a natural stream from its storm
sewers. Whenever sustained rains fell on the area, the stream, swelled
by the storm sewers, would overflow onto the golf course. This caused,
not only flodding, but also erosion and permanent damage to the turf.
The court of appeals held that a municipal corporation could construct
storm sewers to drain into a natural stream, regardless of the effects,
such as flooding, when such stream was the natural outlet for the sur-
face waters in that area.
The court, in the Oakwood case, relied primarily on the supreme
court's decision in Mason v. Commissioners of Fulton County,'" which is
one of a series of Ohio cases' announcing the rule as aforesaid. The
court pointed out that the Supreme Court of Ohio had never adopted the
"capacity of the stream" rule which allows drainage into a natural stream
only in the amount that can be carried off.
The decision in the Oakwood case can be contrasted to that in John-
son v. Goodview Homes - 1, Incorporated." Defendant had constructed
apartments and parking areas in an urban area on land higher than
and adjacent to plaintiff's. The court held that plaintiff was entitled to
damages and an injunction to restrain defendant. The significant differ-
ence between Oakwood and Johnson is that in the Johnson situation, the
defendant had increased the flow in other than a natural channel or
waterway. Therefore, the existence and use of a natural stream or water-
14. 165 N.E.2d 699 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960). See also discussion in Torts section, p. 576
infra.
15. 80 Ohio St. 151, 88 NE. 401 (1909).
16. City of Hamilton v. Ashbrook, 62 Ohio St. 511, 57 NE. 239 (1900); Springfield v.
Spence, 39 Ohio St. 665 (1883).
17. 167 N.E.2d 132 (Ohio C.P. 1960).
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